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The Brady Plan:
An Attempt to Solve the Mexican
Debt Crisis
by Steven W. Armbrecht
Mexico, not entirely by its own actions, has experienced a devastating increase in foreign debt. The country's history and policy decisions, in conjunction with actions taken by the developed world, have
allowed Mexico's debt to escalate. In response, various policies and
plans to restructure the debt have been essayed. The Brady Plan,
introduced by the United States in 1989, was designed to be an
important part of the proposed restructuring process. The failure of
this plan to be implemented successfully could affect the United States'
banking community, the International Monetary Fund, the World
Bank, and the fate of Mexico--as well as the rest of the developing
countries experiencing financial difficulties.

History of the Mexican Debt Crisis
In the 1930s it became evident that the rich and more industrialized
nations of the world were dominating Mexico's economy. In an effort
to gain public support and wrest back some control of its economy,
Mexican President Lazaro Cardenas, during his tenure in office (193440), began nationalizing the foreign-owned companies. Nationalization, a process that put many of the private and foreign-owned businesses under direct government control, at first helped Mexico, for
domestic production increased and reliance on imports fell. However,
losses incurred by foreign investors as a result of nationalization were
a source of irritation in international relations.
With the outbreak of World War II, the Allies were forced to settle
their differences with Mexico in order to use its oil and productive
capacity in the war effort. This induced Mexican industry to operate at
full capacity to meet both external and internal demand (Rudolf 1985,
p. 167). As a result of the Allied demand for war goods, there was a tremendous inflow of capital into Mexico. This increased the income of
the average Mexican worker, and the resultant increase in demand for
goods put an additional strain on productive capacity.
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After the war, Mexico suddenly found that its products were no
longer in great demand in the more industrialized countries. In
addition, the U.S. began diverting its attention to rebuilding Japan and
the war-torn nations of Europe, utilizing American rather th an Mexican production facilities. As a result, Mexico was left wi th excess
productive capacity. Mexico' s solution to thi s problem was to stimulate domestic demand by th e active promotion of import substi tution
industrializatio n (IS]) policies (Rudolf 1985, p . 167). Under ISI policies,
Mexico would produce domestically many of the products it had
previously imported . The intention was both to become more selfsufficient and to utilize productive capacity. These ISI policies were
continued from the end of the war through the early 1970s. The result
was an enlarged middle class that demand ed more consumer and
social goods. The rising costs of social programs and fall ing revenues
as trade declined in the middle seventi es, however, caused a severe
budget d eficit. The Mexican government found itself in a finan cial
predicament.
Mexico was forced to borrow heavily from abroad to pay for
expanded social programs and to further develop its oil fields . World
oil prices rose sharply in the 1970s, thu s spurring Mexico to increase oil
production. The risin g oil price was caused by the Organization of
Pe troleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC) cutback in production and by
the resulting increased world oil demand . Although Mexico was not
a member of the OPEC cartel, it found its oil exports to the industrialized nations increasing rapidly.
In 1981, however, the situation drastically changed. The combination of a recession in the industrialized nations and a d epressed world
oil market caused Mexico's current account deficit to rise to [US] $13
billion. Also, higher world interest rates on the external debt caused
the public to lose confidence in the peso, and capital flight ensued
(Rudolf 1985, p . 179). Capital moved to perceived safe havens like the
United States or the Bahamas and forced Mexico to replace declining
revenues with borrowed funds. As the world oil price weakened in the
1980s and interest rates on borrowed money rose, Mexico's debt
expanded more and more rapidly, creating concern in the lending
nations.

Early Attempts to Solve the Debt Crisis
When the United Nations was formed after World War II, the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCT AD)
was created to help the developing countries establish more favorable
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trade and price balances for their products in the world market.
Through UNCT AD the United Nations tried to establish the New
International Economic Order (NIEO) in the early 1970s. NIEO would,
in essence, forgive the debts of the developing countries and create a
level playing field in the world marketplace. Unfortunately, UNCT AD
has not been particularly effective. Forgiving developing country debt
would require huge financial losses and was no guarantee that the
nations would stay out of debt because external financial resources
would still be needed. Therefore this UN plan was never seriously
considered by the nations holding the debt.
As their financial difficulties continued to mount in the 1980s,
Mexico and many developing countries continued to demand financial
assistance from the industrialized countries. However, these demands
were not heeded. Mexico and the developing countries then turned to
the International Monetary Fund for help. However, the United States
and other countries providing funds to the International Monetary
Fund were reluctant to increase funding to levels necessary to help all
developing nations. Instead, they provided provisional loans and
attempted to create an environment of free trade which they felt would
help solve the debt problem by increasing the flow of external revenues
to indebted nations.
Unfortunately, free trade cannot totally solve the debt problem.
Exports from Mexico and the other developing countries are typically
primary products, the prices of which are highly unstable; indeed,
production increases often cause prices and revenues to fall. In effect,
trade in these products does not generate cash flow fast enough or large
enough to retire developing country debt.
The United States finally recognized the severity of Mexico's debt
and, in 1982, initiated the Baker Plan, formulated by then U.S. Treasury
Secretary James Baker III. The plan was based on the premise that oil
prices would soon rise and generate a positive cash flow. Mexico's
debt was rescheduled further into the future to allow Mexico time to
reap these expected gains. However, the price of oil did not rise; in
fact, it declined. The Baker Plan was a failure because the combination
of further declining revenues and increased lending to repay the restructured debt forced Mexico and many other developing countries
even deeper into debt.

The Brady Plan
As the debt in the developing countries continued to expand, U.S.
Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady presented a new plan for' debt
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reduction on March 10, 1989. Brady's plan targeted Mexico because the
Mexican d ebt at the end of 1988 was approximately [US) $107 billion
and defau lt on thi s d ebt could severely damage the U.S. economy.
The Brady Plan was devised to deter Mexico and /or any other
developing cou ntry from defaultin g on current external obligations.
The main objec tives of the plan were to:

* alleviate the scarcity of financial resources;
* reverse

capital fli ght;

* maintain the important role of the international financial
institutions and preserve their financial integrity;
* encourage

debt and debt service reduction on a voluntary

basis;

* recognize the importance of continued new lending and;
*

provid e free markets.

If achieved in Mexico, these objecti ves would be implemented in the
other developing countries to reduce their d ebts ("Excerpts From
Brady Remarks on Debt" 1989, p. 37).
The plan recognized that financial institutions are apprehensive
about lending money to the heavily indebted d eveloping countries. It
recognized as well that the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank, both created by the United Nations, face financial difficulty as more countries need money. Since these institutions are not
receiving additional contributions from the member countries, financial assistance continues to be inadequate. In addition, capital fli ght
continues to be a large problem as nationals in the financially unstable
countries deposit large portions of their wealth outside the country.
They have done this to keep their wealth intact and to earn higher
returns than they can in the unstable domestic economy. If this capital
could be reattracted to the developing countries, its investment in the
domestic economy could provide a stimulant to economic growth.
Two solutions were put forth by Secretary Brady to solve these
problems. In the long run, free markets were seen as the answer to the
debt problem. Free markets with low trad e barriers would increase
trade between nations. By applying the theory of comparative advantage which states that a nation should export products it can produce

Steven W. Armbrecht

Page 21

at a relatively lower cost and import products it cannot produce as
cheaply as other nations, a positive cash flow could be generated to
repay the debt. This idea is not new. It has been part of many proposed
solutions to Mexico's debt problem.
Secondly, in the short run, Treasury Secretary Brady believed debt
reductions and lowered interest rates on all new loans would offer a
respite until these economies could become self-sufficient and benefit
from free markets. Brady recommended guidelines for U.S. banks to
follow in reducing developing country debt. These guidelines consisted of three options:
1) exchange their credits for new bonds carrying a fixed annual
interest rate of 6.25 percent (compared with floating
interest rates of more than 10 percent);
2) accept a 35 percent reduction in the face value of their loans;

or
3) provide additional loans. (Truell 1989, p. A13).
Under option one, the new bonds would be United States Treasury
bonds. These more financially sound securities would give banks the
incentive to implement the first option. Brady believed implementation of all or part of the recommended debt reduction play (option two)
would cut down the developing countries' debt and the interest paid
on it, while allowing developing countries to continue borrowing to
buttress their economies (option three) (Kilborn 1989, p. 35).
The first test of the Brady Plan to manage Latin America's $400
billion debt was to be aimed at Mexico. It was anticipated that a United
States show of confidence in Mexico's ability to recover economically,
along with a modest amount of financial aid, would trigger a surge of
new investment. In particular, Mexico anticipated that money held by
Mexicans abroad (some $84 billion, according to a 1988 estimate by
Morgan Guaranty Trust) would be reinvested directly into the Mexican economy (Moffett 1989, p. Al). As a result, Mexico would have
some financial maneuvering room. Once the financial sector gained
some respite from the imminent short-term debt problems, new business investment would allow markets and free trade to solve a major
portion of the debt crisis.
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Problems with the Brady Plan
Unfortunately, many problems ha ve arisen since the plan's announcement in 1989. The Bush ad ministration and Mexico hoped that
the hundreds of creditor banks would choose to follow the options
proposed by the Brady Plan. This in itself was a huge supposition as
banks wrestled with how to get the best return on thei r current
investments at an acceptable risk level. Many larger banks' loan
portfolios are heavily laden with loans to foreign countries. Many
banks arc also under heavy pressure from sha reh old ers not to offer
new loans to the developing countries (Duke 1989, p. A11 ). These loans
were made when the rate of return was projected to be high, but now
lenders arc skittish because of rumors of d efa ult and interest rate
restructuring, both of which will reduce banks' profits.
Chase Manhattan Corporation came up with its own op tion and
began set ting up large reserves to use as a buffer to write down its
overseas loans. It decid ed not to lend any new money to Mexico or the
other d eveloping nations. If this policy persists_and is followed by
other banks, Mexico and the other developing coun tries will be unable
to make interest paymen ts on current debt and may have to default on
their loans (Guenther 1989, p . A3).
To offset Chase Manhattan's action, the Bush administration, in
September 1989, offered an incentive to the banks. The Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) would allow banks to write down losses
at a slower rate. By slowing the write down process, the banks' losses
from the investments would not be as large as otherwise. By keeping
their profits up, banks would appear more financially secure, satisfy
their stockholders, and increase flexibility to lenders, thus allowing
them to offer new loans to Mexico and other d ebt-laden countries as the
Brady Plan intended (Duke 1989, p. Al 1).
Unfortunately, a second dilemma loomed on the horizon as it
became apparent that the Brady Plan was in reality unlikely significantly to reduce Mexico's$100billion foreign debt. It appeared that the
debt would continue to escalate even if Mexico and the other developing nations received new loans. To deal with the problem, the new
focus of the Brady Plan was to cut back interest payments on foreign
bank debt and provide further loans (Truell 1989, p. A13). However,
these short-term fixes will do little to help Mexico provide a climate
conducive to economic recovery in the markets and free trade arena. If
Mexico's economy falters, new loans to help bail it out w ill be hard to
find.
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The United States has already issued Treasury bonds to finance
some of Mexico's short-term debt. Issuing more Treasury bonds to
offset the financial sectors' unwillingness to incur losses would be folly.
Any additional bonds issued would only shift the debt from banks to
the U.S. Treasury, or to the International Monetary Fund and World
Bank, which, in turn, are heavily financed by the United States.
Loan portfolios of the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank are currently coming under pressure. Both institutions are faced
with increased demand for loans from the developing countries as
private banks have become reluctant to extend them credit. Consequently, many of the loans from these institutions have been made to
the least creditworthy and most heavily indebted countries (Roberts
1989, p. A14). These loans have been made to keep debt-ridden
countries from defaulting. As funds from the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank dry up, the United States may be unwilling
to provide additional funds.
A final ironyisthataseconomicproblems have mounted in Mexico
and other debt-ridden nations, the United States is seen by foreigners
as a safe place to invest money. The Brady Plan does not address the
underlying structural problems that have turned the United States into
one of the world's biggest tax havens (Moffett 1989, p. Al). Currently,
foreign investments are, for the most part, taxable only by the United
States; they are protected from the tax laws of the country of origin.
Mexico anticipated that the implementation of the Brady Plan would
provide a positive economic climate which would attract some of the
capital back from where it is sheltered.

Other Aspects of the Brady Plan
Even though the Brady Plan has not been implemented as planned,
it has triggered a surge of economic development and new optimism in
Mexico, which has helped keep skittish investors from sending even
more money abroad (Moffett 1989, p. Al). Mexico must continue on a
path of accelerated economic development. Though reattracting the
capital invested outside of the country is necessary, it is not enough. In
addition, the market economy and free trade will need to be bolstered
by financial sources and/or government supported programs to help
complete the recovery.
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari of Mexico spent his first ten
months in office implementing government programs designed to
influence those Mexican capitalists with wealth abroad to reinvest in
Mexico. He has instituted trade liberalization and new foreign-invest-
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ment regulations. He has deregulated transportation and announced
the sale of some sta te controll ed enterprises. Moreover, privatizations
now und er consideration in the steel, fertili zer, and banking sectors
would further increase investor confidence. Even Mexico' s protected
petroleum industry has been partially opened to private and foreign
investment (Baer 1989, p . A13). However, Mexico's domesti c debt
remains oppressi ve.
President Salinas and the Mexican government have not und ertaken these policy changes without political and private sector opposition . The opposition is concerned that too mu ch foreign investment
will return Mexico to the position of domination by foreign-owned
businesses. However, nationa lized businesses have not helped solve
the debt problem; in fact, th ey may ha ve ca used Mexican in ves tors to
invest their money ou t of reach of th e government. Encouraging
d omestic and foreign in vestment should provide capital and create a
positive environment for progress. Thus, the Brady Plan, coupled with
the actions ta ken by Presid ent Salinas,could provide some respite from
Mexico's debt crisis.

Conclusion
Even though the problem of finding financing to help Mexico and
the other developing nations seems insurmountable, it could be alleviated by a concerted effort by all the countries of the world, not just the
United States. As a major world leader, the United States must
convince other capital-rich countries to invest in Mexico and other
developing countries. If bilateral attempts do not achieve any positive
results, mu ltilateral attempts in the United Nations must be undertaken to demonstrate why it is in everyone's best interest to solve the
d eveloping nations' debt problems. Should sufficient financial aid not
be extended and Mexico defaults on its debt, the resulting domino
effect as other developing countries default could cause international
monetary instability, if not world-wide depression.
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund mu st receive increased funding from other countries. The United States has
provided a large percentage of the funds to these institutions since the
United Nations' inception after World War II, but many nations are
economically better off now than they were then and could shoulder a
larger share of the burden. Since no country exists in isolation, all
countries must cooperate in order to survive.
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